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ARE WE ADOPTING THE ORPHANS, OR 
CREATING THEM? MEDICAL ETHICS AND 
LEGAL JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDANCE FOR 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE  
ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
LYDIA RAW

 
INTRODUCTION 
The Orphan Drug Act (“the Act”) is the epitome of reaction-based 
legislation. High-profile cases, the facts of which pull on the heart-strings 
of even the most stoic among us, spurred both the original enactment and 
subsequent calls for change. At first, these cases concerned the discovery 
of potentially life-saving drugs set aside untested for fear that they were 
not economically viable.
1
 Then came the cases of blockbuster orphan 
drugs, drugs that received the benefits of the Act and were originally 
approved by the FDA for orphan indications, but whose approval was later 
expanded to include mass-market indications, leading to billions in sales.
2
 
More recently, orphan drug prices topping half-a-million dollars annually 
per patient have pushed the limits of affordability for patients and 
 
 
  Primary Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. expected 2017, 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Louis Lasagna, Who Will Adopt the Orphan Drugs?, 3 REGULATION 27, 28 (1979); See also, 
Judith Randal, The Orphan Drug Game, 7(1) THE WILSON QUARTERLY 7, 17 (1983) (“[M]any known 
remedies for more obscure ailments . . . are ‘orphaned’ by the economics of the U.S. drug industry.”); 
A Methadone Alternative?, 83(11) THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF NURSING 1529, 1529 (1983) 
(statement by the Director of the Division of Research at the National Institute of Drug Addictions that 
LAAM, a methadone alternative, was unlikely to be commercially available despite published studies 
showing it to be as safe and effective); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69(6) 
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1034 n.42 (1983) (“For a novel drug used to treat only a very rare disease, the cost 
of establishing the drug’s safety may exceed the profit that can be earned by marketing it. The 
manufacturer then has no economic incentive to market the drug . . . .”). 
 2. This issue is sometimes called “orphan drug creep.” Michael Drummond & Adrian Towse, 
Orphan Drug Policies: A Suitable Case for Treatment, 15 Eur. J. Health Econ. 335, 336 (2014). See 
Dina Guzovsky, How a blockbuster drug can become a subsidized ‘orphan,’ CNBC (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://nbr.com/2015/12/02/how-a-blockbuster-drug-can-become-a-subsidized-orphan/ (describing a 
study in the American Journal of Clinical Oncology which suggests that the Orphan Drug Act has 
companies “gaming the system to use the law for mainstream drugs”). See also Marty Makary, One 
Pharma Fix: Limit the ‘Orphan Drug’ Incentives, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/one-pharma-fix-limit-the-orphan-drug-incentives-1450645511 (giving the 
example of Rituximab, originally submitted as a treatment for a subtype of non-Hodgkin lymphoma, 
this drug is now the 12th best-selling medication of all time in the U.S.). 
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insurance companies alike.
3
 Now, as an improved understanding of the 
human genome leads to the dawn of personalized medicine, concerns 
about rising costs prompt more calls to reform the Act.
4
  
For the 30 million Americans living with often untreatable rare 
diseases and conditions, encouraging pharmaceutical production is a top 
priority.
5
 This is almost one in ten Americans—a staggering percentage of 
the overall population. Collectively, they are affected with more than 
6,800 different rare diseases with different causes and different treatment 
needs.
6
 While pharmaceutical companies and the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) tout the fact that since the Act was passed, 
between 250 and 400 new treatments have been approved to treat rare 
diseases,
7
 advocates for those with rare conditions argue that this is not 
nearly enough. Even after accounting for these new treatments, less than 
5% of rare diseases have a treatment.
8
 Moreover, the number of 
Americans whose condition is labeled “rare” is expected to rise under the 
FDA’s current interpretation of the Act, because research pharmaceutical 
 
 
 3. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Sky-High Prices for Orphan Drugs Slam American 
Families and Insurers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://khn.org/news/sky-high-prices-
for-orphan-drugs-slam-american-families-and-insurers/. See also Steven Syre, High prices for drugs to 
treat rare diseases take a toll, THE BOSTON GLOBE (May 12, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe 
.com/business/2015/05/11/high-prices-for-drugs-treat-rare-diseases-take-toll/qrM8s57p3EDQ2TwM5 
i9s5H/story.html (stating the average price of an orphan drug in 2014 was over $137,000 per patient 
per year). 
 4. See Ed Silverman, Tiger in the Fiscal Room: Beware the Increasing Cost and Number of 
Orphan Drugs, MANAGED CARE (March 2013) (“There is another reason that such pricing may 
continue, and that is the promised growth in personalized medicine . . . .”). See generally Joseph 
Guinto, The High Price of Precision Healthcare, GENOME MAGAZINE (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://genomemag.com/reimbursement/#.VqU30V6DHIU.  
 5. Frequently Asked Questions, GENETIC AND RARE DISEASES INFORMATION CENTER AT THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/about-gard/pages/31/frequently-
asked-questions (last visited April 6, 2017) (reporting that between 25 and 30 million Americans are 
estimated to be affected by rare diseases). 
 6. Id. 
 7. The reason for this wide range in reported new treatments is unclear. Perhaps the 
pharmaceutical companies, which tend to report on the high side, wish to show the Act is working and 
should not be amended, whereas some government agencies, which tend to report on the low end, wish 
to show the continued problem and need for their agency to receive funding. Compare America’s 
BioPharmaceutical Research Companies, Rare Diseases: A Report on Orphan Drugs in the Pipeline, 
MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT, at 3 (2013), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
Rare_Diseases_2013.pdf  (“more than 400 medicines . . . have been approved to treat rare diseases” 
between 1983 and 2013), and Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5 (reporting that “more than 
340 treatments for rare diseases” were approved by the FDA between 1983 and 2008), with Why 
TRND Matters, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCES AT THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/trnd (last visited April 6, 2017) (“only about 250 
treatments are available” for rare and neglected diseases).  
 8. America’s BioPharmaceutical Research Companies, supra note 7, at 3. 
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companies are increasingly able to split more common conditions into 
subsets based on what particular genetic variation caused the disorder.
9
 
This Note traces the subtle changes in the underlying purposes of the 
Act, and evaluates those purposes from the perspectives of medical ethics 
and legal jurisprudence. Part I begins with the history of the Act discussed 
not chronologically, but issue by issue, to elucidate the subtle changes in 
the purpose of the Act through its history. Part II explores the moral and 
ethical issues presented by the Act to identify eleven guiding principles 
from medical ethics and legal jurisprudence. Finally, Part III applies these 
guiding principles to the most common proposed amendments to the Act. 
It is my hope that through a holistic understanding of the guiding 
principles which inform the Act from medical and legal perspectives, 
amendments will no longer be viewed as patches to fix the “problem 
drugs” gaining national attention, but as opportunities to strengthen the 
policy goals underlying the Act. 
PART I: HISTORY OF THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
A. What is an Orphan Drug? 
Any discussion of the Orphan Drug Act must necessarily begin with an 
explanation of what an “orphan drug” is. The answer to that question has 
gradually shifted over the life of the Act. “Orphan drug” has been defined 
since the passage of the original 1983 Orphan Drug Act (“the 1983 Act”) 
as a treatment for a rare disease or condition (often called an “orphan 
disease” or “orphan condition”).10 But the 1983 Act was not the origin of 
the term “orphan drug.” Originally, “orphan drug” was a term applied to 
drugs that no company wanted to sponsor through the FDA’s approval 
process, often in spite of promising preliminary test results.
11
 As stated in 
1979, “orphan drug cases” arise when “an agent with exciting potential for 
 
 
 9. See discussion infra Part I(G). 
 10. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2049 (1983) (“The Congress finds 
that—, (1) there are many diseases and conditions . . . which affect such small numbers of individuals 
residing in the United States that the diseases and conditions are considered rare in the United States;   
. . . (3) drugs for these diseases and conditions are commonly referred to as ‘orphan drugs’[.]”). 
 11. A Methadone Alternative?, supra note 1, at 1529 (Statement by the Director of the Division 
of Research at the National Institute of Drug Addictions that LAAM, a methadone alternative, was 
unlikely to be commercially available and that LAAM is “[t]ruly an orphan drug” because no private 
company is interested in it as it is not patentable, and unlikely to be less expensive than the presently 
used methadone). See also Huber, supra note 1, at 1034 n.42 (“The ‘orphan drug’ problem is an 
instance in which burden of proof alone determines that certain products will not come into the market 
regardless of their safety.”). 
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treating human disease is blocked through lack of interest on the part of 
the people and institutions whose commitment is necessary for bringing it 
to market.”12 By 1983, several drugs had gained national attention as a 
result of their former “orphan drug” status.13 Sometimes these drugs were 
figuratively orphaned, abandoned by their creator and bounced from 
company to company as an advocate worked to convince anyone to 
“adopt” the drug through the FDA’s testing and approval process.14 Other 
times, a drug was orphaned when its primary use became obsolete and the 
manufacturer halted production despite the drug’s secondary benefit as 
treatment for a rare condition.
15
 Prior to 1983, the term “orphan drug” 
referred to existing drugs which no company would adopt. 
Today, the term “orphan drug” refers to treatments researched and 
developed specifically for the treatment of rare diseases and conditions.
16
 
These treatments are then called “orphan drugs” because they treat an 
orphan condition. Companies are not adopting orphaned drugs; they are 
adopting orphaned conditions—conditions not traditionally researched for 
fear that any treatment would not be economically viable.
17
  
B. Why are Drugs Orphaned? 
There are two related reasons why pharmaceutical companies are likely 
to abandon a drug: patent ineligibility and a belief that the drug would not 
be sufficiently profitable. Patent ineligibility of orphaned drugs is common 
 
 
 12. Lasagna, supra note 1, at 28. See also Randal, supra note 1, at 17 (“[M]any known remedies 
for more obscure ailments are not being produced. They are ‘orphaned’ by the economics of the U.S. 
drug industry.”). 
 13. One example, L-dopa, was orphaned for almost 40 years, from 1930 to 1970. Randal, supra 
note 1. Still today L-dopa is the primary treatment for Parkinson’s Disease. Jackie Hunt Christensen, 
The Medication Question, NATIONAL PARKINSON FOUNDATION, http://www.parkinson.org/ 
understanding-parkinsons/newly-diagnosed/medication-question (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).  
 14. Lasagna, supra note 1, at 29 (delineating the extenuating process which Dr. Stephen De 
Felice undertook to convince any company to bring carnitine, a treatment for heart disease, to market. 
Other examples in the article include Dopamine (shock, kidney blood flow), triethylene tetramine 
(lifesaving treatment for Wilson’s Disease), and L-5HTP (Parkinsonism)).  
 15. Randal, supra note 1 (giving the example of Mapharsen, a former treatment for syphilis 
which can cure the rare bladder disorder pyuria). 
 16. Sara Reardon, Regulators Adopt More Orphan Drugs, 508 NATURE 16, 17 (April 3, 2014) 
(giving the example of Pfizer, which is targeting sickle-cell disease). See generally America’s 
BioPharmaceutical Research Companies, supra note 7. 
 17. Some critics believe that pharmaceutical companies are only targeting the sorts of orphan 
conditions which are most likely to be economically viable. These critics argue that a disproportionate 
number of new orphan designations are for rare cancers, and that these types of treatments typically 
command higher prices than other orphan drugs. André Côté & Bernard Keating, What is Wrong with 
Orphan Drug Policies?, 15 VALUE IN HEALTH 1185, 1186 (2012) (“[D]rugs used to treat cancer are, 
by far, the most profitable.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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in two scenarios. First, imagine that researchers are attempting to find a 
novel treatment for high blood pressure, a common condition. Generally, 
researchers will identify a molecular structure within the body that they 
want the drug to interact with (also called a “target”). The researchers will 
then identify a large number of chemical compounds that they believe are 
likely to interact with or bind to that target.
18
 Through early testing, 
researchers will narrow the list of compounds based on specific testing 
criteria, such as the ability to bind to the target molecular structure.
19
 
During this process, researchers sometimes observe compounds that do 
not meet the testing criteria but nevertheless may be useful for some other 
purpose, such as the treatment of an orphan condition. Particularly in the 
non-profit and university setting, these compounds may then be 
disseminated in a scientific publication, a presentation at a research 
conference, or a thesis, making them ineligible for patent protection.
20
  
Second, imagine that a marine researcher discovers that a Caribbean 
sea sponge contains a compound with the potential to treat cancer.
21
 The 
compound she discovers is a natural product, defined as a compound 
extracted or isolated from marine organisms, bacteria, fungi, or plants.
22
 
Unfortunately for the future of her discovery, the patentability of natural 
products has been questionable since 2013 when the Supreme Court held 
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
23
 that “a 
naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent 
eligible merely because it has been isolated.”24 Regardless of the reason, 
 
 
 18. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, PhRMA at 4 (2015), http://phrma-
docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the claimed 
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise 
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). In 2012 Congress passed the America Invents Act (“AIA”) which provides a limited one-year 
grace period for disclosures made by the inventor before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).  
 21. Cytosaur-U® is “a staple for treating leukemia and lymphoma” and was found in a Caribbean 
sea sponge. Medicines By Design Chapter 3: Drugs From Nature, Then and Now, NIGMS,  
https://publications.nigms.nih.gov/medbydesign/chapter3.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2011). 
 22. Natural Products Research—Information for Researchers, NCCIH (accessed Jan. 18, 2017) 
https://nccih.nih.gov/grants/naturalproducts. 
 23. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
 24. Id. The impact of this decision expands beyond orphan drugs. See David J. Newman & 
Gordon M. Cragg, Natural Products as Sources of New Drugs from 1980 to 2014, 79(3) J. NAT. PROD. 
629, 629 (2016) (From the 1940s to the end of 2014, 49% of the small molecule drugs approved by the 
FDA were “either natural products or directly derived therefrom.”). For examples of what is and is not 
patentable post-Myriad, see Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Life Sciences, USPTO (May 6, 
2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf. For examples of pre-
Myriad challenges to obtaining a patent on a natural product, see Lasagna, supra note 1 (giving the 
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compounds which are ineligible for patent protection are more likely to be 
passed over by pharmaceutical companies out of fear that they will not be 
able to recover the costs associated with drug development and FDA 
approval before a generic enters the market.
25
  
A pharmaceutical company is also likely to forego research on a 
particular drug if the company simply does not believe the drug will make 
a profit.
26
 In the world of pharmaceutical pricing, to be pursued, a drug 
must be profitable enough to recover not only the cost its own research 
and development but also costs incurred in researching and developing 
other drugs that do not reach the market. Traditionally, these high-profit 
drugs, called “blockbuster” drugs, have been the financial backbone of the 
pharmaceutical industry.
27
 When the only known use for a particular drug 
is to treat a rare condition, it is a simple economic decision for the 
company to direct resources away from the “orphan drug” towards 
products with higher demand.
28
 But there are some cases, like 
pharmaceuticals for rare and life threatening conditions, where for moral 
and ethical reasons we may not want economics to dictate the choices of 
market players.
29
  
C. The 1983 Act and the 1984 Amendments 
The Orphan Drug Act, as passed in 1983, aimed to create access to 
treatments for rare conditions where those treatments were not reaching 
the market because of either economic infeasibility due to a small affected 
population, or the manufacturer’s inability to patent the product. The 1983 
Act allowed the “manufacturer or the sponsor of a drug [to] request the 
Secretary to designate the drug as a drug for a rare disease or condition.”30 
“Rare disease or condition” was defined as “any disease or condition 
 
 
examples of carnitine, dopamine and L-5HTP as natural product drugs that became orphans in part 
because of their patent ineligibility). 
 25. Jamie F. Cardenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic 
Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 131617 (2014) 
(“[G]enerics tend to dominate the product market immediately after patent protection ends, sometimes 
capturing up to 90% of the market within their first year or two after entry.”). 
 26. Id. at 1307 (“It is estimated that bringing a new pharmaceutical product to market today can 
cost upwards of $1 billion.”). 
 27. Id. at 131617 (Noting the reliance of brand name companies on “blockbuster” products, and 
noting also that this model may be dying as we reach the bottom of the “patent cliff”).  
 28. Lasagna, supra note 1. 
 29. See discussion infra Part II. 
 30. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 204950 (1983) (“The Congress 
finds that . . .  it is in the public interest to provide such changes and incentives for the development of 
orphan drugs.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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which occurs so infrequently in the United States that there is no 
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in 
the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered 
from sales in the United States of such drug.”31 Practically, this provision 
required drug sponsors to undertake an extensive economic analysis of 
development costs and expected revenues. Not only was this analysis 
time-consuming and costly, but also most sponsors were unwilling to 
reveal the internal financing information required by the analysis. 
Consequently, one of the major criticisms of the Orphan Drug Act as 
originally passed was its failure to define “rare disease” in a way that 
could be readily applied.
32
  
Congress responded to these criticisms with a set of amendments 
passed in 1984.
33
 After hearings considering “how [the] FDA and the 
pharmaceutical industry could ease the administrative burden of proving 
market conditions by economic data, and to make the process of applying 
for orphan drug designations easier,”34 the Act was amended to add an 
alternative set of requirements for orphan drug designation. Subsequently, 
instead of showing through lengthy financial disclosures that the drug is 
not economically viable, the drug sponsor can obtain orphan drug 
designation by showing a basis for “concluding that the drug is for a 
disease or condition that is rare in the United States, including . . . (i) [t]he 
size and other known demographic characteristics of the patient population 
affected and the source of this information.”35  Additionally, the Act 
specifically defined “rare disease or condition” as a disease or condition 
that “affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States.”36 However, 
for drugs that target a population exceeding 200,000 people, obtaining an 
orphan drug designation still requires detailed financial disclosures 
showing the drug is not economically viable.
37
 
The Congressional findings from the 1983 Act explain that the purpose 
of the Act was to encourage the research and manufacture of drugs for the 
 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Martha J. Carter & Alan R. Bennett, Developments in Orphan Drugs, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. 
L.J. 627, 627 (1989). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815, 2817 (1984). 
 34. David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 129 (2000) (explaining the early history of Congressional hearings in much 
greater depth than the present discussion). 
 35. Orphan Drug Act, 21 C.F.R. § 316.10(8) & 316.20(8). 
 36. Id. at § 316.20(8)(i) & 316.20(8). This is the broadest definition of rare disease worldwide. 
See infra note 99. 
 37. Id. at § 316.10(8)(ii). I could find no examples of drugs approved under this section.  
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treatment of rare diseases and conditions that were not being developed 
because they were not economically viable.
38
 Congress found: 
(4) because so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease 
or condition, a pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan 
drug may reasonably expect the drug to generate relatively small 
sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug and 
consequently to incur a financial loss; [and]  
(5) there is reason to believe that some promising orphan drugs will 
not be developed unless changes are made in the applicable Federal 
laws to reduce the costs of developing such drugs and to provide 
financial incentives to develop such drugs . . .
39
 
The 1983 Act directly reflected this purpose by giving orphan drug 
designations only to drugs demonstrated to be not economically viable. 
However, when this method of obtaining orphan drug status proved too 
onerous, such that pharmaceutical companies were unwilling to undertake 
the research required to make the showing, the law changed. Now we use 
a numerical stand-in for the economically viable requirement: under 
200,000 Americans affected.  
While this change certainly made the incentives of the Act more 
enticing to pharmaceutical companies, it has also had some limitations. 
For example, some of the orphaned drugs that gained national attention 
prior to passage of the Act might still have become orphaned under the 
changes.
40
 Additionally, the 1984 amendments have opened the door for 
drugs that treat orphan conditions and also have secondary indications for 
non-orphan conditions.
41
 Pharmaceutical companies market and sell these 
“dual-purpose” drugs to a population larger than is typical for an orphan 
drug, while also benefiting from the streamlined and less expensive 
 
 
 38. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Lasagna, supra note 1 (giving examples of two orphaned drugs which affected populations 
well in access of 200,000 people, but were orphaned because they were natural products ineligible for 
patenting). These sorts of drugs are often economically unviable apart from the exclusivity which the 
Orphan Drug Act can provide. I was unable to find any examples of drugs passed under 21 C.F.R. 
§ 316.10(8)(ii), discussed supra note 37. Accordingly there is no authority suggesting that a drug can 
be claimed to be not economically viable simply because it is unpatentable. 
 41. See discussion of ‘blockbuster’ drugs, infra at Part III & passim. A blockbuster drug is one 
which generates annual sales in excess of $1 billion. Nafees Malik, Has the Era of Blockbuster Drugs 
Come to an End? 20(12) BIOPHARM INT’L (Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.biopharminternational.com/has-
era-blockbuster-drugs-come-end. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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process of FDA approval available under the Act.
42
 Some critics argue that 
Congress’s purpose in passing the Orphan Drug Act was to defray the 
costs of creating drugs that are not expected to be profitable, but that 
companies that take advantage of the Act’s incentives while enjoying 
additional profits from the drug’s secondary indication generate windfall 
profits, contrary to Congress’ intention.43 
D. Incentives 
The Orphan Drug Act provides pharmaceutical developers with several 
incentives, including waiver of the over two-million-dollar new-drug fee, 
tax incentives, enhanced protection from generic competitors, a faster and 
less strenuous FDA review process, and, in some cases, grants. More than 
thirty years later, it remains unclear to what extent each of these provisions 
has contributed to the uptick in orphan drug production,
44
 and, 
accordingly, Congress has been leery to alter the Act’s incentives.45 
The first and simplest incentive offered to pharmaceutical companies is 
a waiver of the human drug application fee.
46
 This has become a 
substantial incentive, as the application fee filed with clinical investigation 
data is set to be $2,038,100 for the 2017 fiscal year.
47
 This amount has 
been increasing rapidly. In 2006, the same application cost only 
 
 
 42. A drug indication is a purpose for which the FDA has approved the drug (also called “labeled 
indication”). Approved drug uses, PUBMED HEALTH (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/approved-drug-uses/. For the purposes of this note, “secondary indication” 
means that the indication was added after an indication for an orphan condition. Off-label use is when 
the drug is prescribed for a use other than the FDA approved indication. 
 43. Id. The term “windfall profits” typically means large and unexpected profits. In this case, 
there is some indication that the profits are not unexpected from the perspective of the pharmaceutical 
companies, but are an unanticipated result of the Act’s incentive structure. See infra note 109 and 
accompanying text.  
 44. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 93 (2015) (“The 
number of new orphan drugs per year increased thirteen-fold, but empirical analyses have not 
disentangled the effects of the different incentives.”). 
 45. See President Bush’s pocket-veto of a series of amendments in 1990, explaining that the 
amendments would weaken the incentives at the heart of the Act by diluting the market exclusivity 
provisions. Bush Pocket-Vetoes Orphan Drug Measure, in CQ ALMANAC 1990, at 57779 (46th ed., 
1991), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal90-1113412. 
 46. 21 U.S.C. § 379h(a)(1)(F) (“Exception for designated orphan drug or indication: 
A human drug application for a prescription drug product that has been designated as a drug 
for a rare disease or condition pursuant to section 360bb of this title shall not be subject to a 
fee under subparagraph (A), unless the human drug application includes an indication for 
other than a rare disease or condition.”). 
 47. Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. http://www.fda 
.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2016). 
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$767,400.
48
 Increases in  orphan drug applications, which are exempt from 
the application fee and constituted nearly half of the new drugs approved 
in 2015, may be contributing to the rising costs.
49
 
Second, the Act offers tax credits for up to 50% of qualified clinical 
testing expenses.
50
 Critics note that this incentive is more helpful for well-
established companies than for smaller groups of researchers, who might 
not incur sufficient tax liability to benefit from this provision.
51
 
Third, the Act offers enhanced protection from generic competitors. 
Once an orphan drug application is filed, the FDA will not approve 
another application “for such drug for such disease or condition” for seven 
years,
52
 granting the drug’s sponsor complete market exclusivity during 
that time. In contrast, non-orphan drugs generally receive five years of 
exclusivity after approval. The exclusivity granted to non-orphan drugs 
protects only against applications for drugs containing the same active 
moiety.
53
 However, the grant of exclusivity to orphan drugs is subject to 
two limitations: first, where the sponsor is unable to produce “sufficient 
quantities of the drug to meet the needs of persons with the disease or 
condition for which the drug was designated,”54 and second, where the 
new drug is more effective or safer than the drug granted exclusivity.
55
 I 
was unable to find proof that either of these scenarios has ever occurred. 
 
 
 48. Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 44106 
(Aug. 1, 2005). 
 49. Novel Drugs Summary 2015, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov 
/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/ucm474696.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2016)  
(“About 47% of the novel drugs approved in 2015 (21 of 45) were approved to treat rare or “orphan” 
diseases . . . .”). 
 50. 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) provides, generally, that “the credit determined under this section for the 
taxable year is an amount equal to 50 percent of the qualified clinical testing expenses for the taxable 
year.” Further, (b)(1)(A) provides that “the term ‘qualified clinical testing expenses’ means the 
amounts which are paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year which would be described 
in subsection (b) of section 41 if such subsection were applied with the modifications set forth in 
subparagraph (B).”. 
 51. Impact of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit on Treatments for Rare Diseases, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUS. ORG. & NAT’L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS at ii (2015) (“[P]re-market companies without 
existing drug portfolios would see a smaller decline because they cannot use tax credits until they 
begin to have tax liability, often not until after their first drug is approved.”). 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2). 
 53. Renu Lal, Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm44730
7.pdf. Active moiety means “[t]he molecule or ion, excluding those appended portions of the molecule 
that cause the drug to be an ester, salt (including a salt with hydrogen or coordination bonds), or other 
noncovalent derivative (such as a complex, chelate, or clathrate) of the molecule, responsible for the 
physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2016). 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1). 
 55. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(14)(i) “except that if the subsequent drug can be shown to be clinically 
superior to the first drug, it will not be considered to be the same drug.” See also 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(3): 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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Fourth, the Act offers a less strenuous and often faster FDA review 
process.
56
 The FDA has acknowledged that when evaluating rare 
conditions, some flexibility is often required when evaluating evidence of 
effectiveness.
57
 Because the affected population is small, sponsoring 
companies may be unable to conduct human studies on as many subjects,
58
 
and the FDA has explained that “about two-thirds of orphan drugs were 
approved with one adequate and well-controlled trial with supportive 
evidence” in comparison to the two or three trials required for mass market 
drug approval.
59
  
Finally, the Act offers grants in some cases.
60
 In 2016, the FDA 
awarded eighteen grants totaling $19 million dollars for the development 
of drugs intended to treat such rare conditions as sickle cell acute pain, 
HPV-related oropharyngeal cancer, and malignant glioma.
61
 Since 1983, 
“the Orphan Products Grants Program has provided more than $350 
 
 
(3) Clinically superior means that a drug is shown to provide a significant therapeutic 
advantage over and above that provided by an approved drug (that is otherwise the same 
drug) in one or more of the following ways: 
(i) Greater effectiveness than an approved drug (as assessed by effect on a clinically 
meaningful endpoint in adequate and well controlled clinical trials) . . .  
(ii) Greater safety in a substantial portion of the target populations, for example, by the 
elimination of an ingredient or contaminant that is associated with relatively frequent adverse 
effects . . .  
(iii) In unusual cases, where neither greater safety nor greater effectiveness has been shown, a 
demonstration that the drug otherwise makes a major contribution to patient care. 
 56. Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug Development; Draft Guidance for Industry; 
Availability, 80 Fed. Reg. 49246, 49246 (Aug. 17, 2015) (“FDA acknowledges that certain aspects of 
drug development that are feasible for common diseases may not be feasible for rare diseases. FDA 
regulations provide flexibility in applying regulatory standards . . . .”).  
 57. Id. See also Frank J. Sasinowski, FDA Rare Disease Patient Advocacy Day, NAT’L ORG. FOR 
RARE DISORDERS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/ Developing 
ProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/OOPDNewsArchive/UCM294773.pdf (Finding that 67% of 
orphan drug approvals between 1983 and June 30, 2010, excluding rare cancers, “resulted from some 
exercise of FDA flexibility in applying the statutory standard for evidence of effectiveness.”). 
 58. In 2010, program size for orphan drug approvals ranged from 23 to 540 patients. Lawrence J. 
Lesko, Introduction: Rare Diseases, Orphan Drugs, OFFICE OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY: FDA 
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting Materials/ 
Drugs/AdvisoryCommitteeforPharmaceuticalScienceandClinicalPharmacology/UCM247635.pdf. 
 59. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Manipulate Orphan Drug Rules to Create 
Prized Monopolies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://khn.org/news/drugmakers-
manipulate-orphan-drug-rules-to-create-prized-monopolies/. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(c) (“For grants and contracts under subsection (a), there is authorized to 
be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2013 through 2017.”). 
 61. Press Release, FDA, FDA awards 18 grants to stimulate product development for rare 
diseases, (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ 
ucm463539.htm.  
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million to fund more than 570 new clinical studies and supported the 
marketing approval of more than 50 products.”62 
E. Proposed Amendments 
Amendments to the Orphan Drug Act are proposed nearly every year. 
Early amendments were passed in 1984,
63
 1985,
64
 and 1988.
65
 Then, a 
1990 amendment, which would have drastically reshaped the Act’s 
incentives, was passed through both houses before being pocket-vetoed by 
President George H. W. Bush.
66
 In a veto message, President Bush stated: 
“I believe we must not endanger the success of this program, which is due 
in large measure to the existence of the ‘market exclusivity’ provision in 
the Orphan Drug Act.”67 Since then, Congress has expanded some of the 
provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, increasing the availability of grant 
funding to its present amount of $30 million dollars annually
68
 and 
providing priority review for the treatments of rare pediatric diseases.
69
 
Most recently as part of the 21st Century Cures Act, Congress clarified 
that grants for orphan conditions can be used to study the natural history of 
a rare disease as well as the development of therapies, and added an 
additional provision addressing genetically targeted drugs for rare 
diseases.
70
 Nevertheless, these amendments have left the core of the 
Orphan Drug Act, including its incentive structure and definition of 
“orphan drug,” unchanged since 1984.  
Amendments that are not adopted largely fall into one of three 
categories: (1) amendments to address perceived abuses of the Act;
71
 
(2) amendments to further incentivize orphan drug research and enable 
 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. The 1984 amendment primarily redefined “rare disease or condition.”  See discussion supra 
at Part I(C). 
 64. The 1985 amendment primarily extended marketing exclusivity, addressing problems where 
products were patentable, but expired just before or after marketing approval. 
 65. The 1988 amendment required orphan drug designation to be obtained before a New Drug 
Application, marketing approval, or Product License Application could be submitted. 
 66. Bush Pocket-Vetoes Orphan Drug Measure, supra note 45. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee. This amount is currently set to expire at the end of 2017. 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff.  
 70. 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (amending 21 
U.S.C. § 360ee and enacting 21 U.S.C. § 360ff1). The new law in part defines “genetically targeted 
drug” as a drug “for the treatment of a rare disease or condition . . . . that is serious or life threatening.” 
 71. See, e.g., The Orphan Drug Program Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 386, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(seeking to modify market exclusivity to only the characteristic or feature that rendered the drug 
clinically superior to a previously approved drug). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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discovered treatments to reach patents faster;
72
 or (3) amendments to 
clarify the relationship between the Orphan Drug Act and other laws.
73
 It 
is the proposed amendments falling into the first category that are 
commonly spurred by national reports of injustice, and which I am 
characterizing as “reactionary changes.”74 Often, these proposed 
amendments are the product of public outrage at the next expensive new 
orphan drug. These criticisms began before the Act with a drug for a rare 
condition priced at $1,620 annually per patent.
75
 Now the most expensive 
orphan drug commands a price of over $536,000 per patient per year,
76
 the 
average price tag has risen to $111,820,
77
 and drug pricing is constantly 
under media scrutiny.
78
  
F. Additional Sticking Point: How is Success Measured? 
There are many who consider the Orphan Drug Act a success because 
more than 400 new drugs and biological products targeted at rare diseases 
have come to market since its passage.
79
 If the determining factor in 
success is greater research and development in the orphan drug area, then 
the fact that from 2008 to 2013, one-third of new drug approvals were for 
orphan drugs, suggests that the Act has been a success.
80
  
The Act also has a number of critics who argue that many of the 
treatments coming to market under the Orphan Drug Act are not the types 
of treatments Congress meant to incentivize. These critics are concerned 
that the only orphan conditions targeted by pharmaceutical companies are 
 
 
 72. See, e.g., Unlocking Lifesaving Treatments for Rare-Diseases Act (“ULTRA”) H.R. 3737, 
112th Cong. (2011) (working to create an accelerated approval pathway for ultra-rare diseases). 
 73. See, e.g., Preserving Access to Orphan Drugs Act of 2015, H.R. 3678, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(“[C]larifying the orphan drug exception to the annual fee on branded prescription pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and importers . . . .”). 
 74. Consider the news sources, supra notes 14. 
 75. Lasagna, supra note 1, at 3031 (giving the example of L-5HTP for Parkinsonism).  
 76. Marissa Piazzola, Rx Nation: Top 5 Most Expensive Drugs in the U.S., FOXBUSINESS (June 
8, 2015) http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/06/08/rx-nation-top-5-most-expensive-drugs-in-
us-per-patient-per-year.html (Soliris reportedly costs $536,629 per U.S. patient per year and treats a 
life-threatening condition that only affects 8,000 Americans. It is also used to treat a second ultra-rare 
and life-threatening disorder: atypical hemolytic uremic syndrome.). 
 77. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 3. 
 78. See, e.g., supra notes 24. 
 79. America’s BioPharmaceutical Research Companies, supra note 7, at 1. 
 80. Id. at 5. That percentage has continued to rise. In 2014, 41% of novel new drugs (17 of 41) 
were for rare diseases. Jonathan Goldsmith, Another Tool Helping Developers Navigate the Difficult 
Road to Approval of Drugs for Rare Diseases, FDAVOICE (Sept. 15, 2015) http://blogs.fda.gov/ 
fdavoice/index.php/tag/orphan-drug-act/. 
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those predicted to yield a substantial profit.
81
 In support, these critics cite 
the fact that less than 5% of rare diseases have a treatment, and most new 
orphan drug designations are targeted only at certain subsets of the rare 
disease population, like rare cancers.
82
 Cancer treatments are known to 
command high prices and yield high profits.
83
 Accordingly, critics believe 
the Act is doing too much to incentivize the creation of treatments so 
financially lucrative that no additional incentive was needed.  
G. Modern Changes, or, the New Purpose of the Orphan Drug Act? 
The number of conditions qualifying for orphan drug status is predicted 
to continue rising, as scientists identify the specific cells or genetic 
variations causing each individual’s condition.84 This has allowed 
pharmaceutical companies to divide more common conditions into smaller 
subgroups that in turn qualify for incentives under the Act. This is not a 
theoretical prediction of the future, but a projection based on the current 
status of the pharmaceutical industry. For example, in 2013, at least 21 
different treatments for lymphoma were granted orphan drug designation, 
even though the condition affects approximately 700,000 people in the 
United States.
85
 These treatments obtained orphan designation because 
they were directed to a particular subset of individuals with lymphoma.
86
 
Critics have called the practice of partitioning a condition into subsets 
“salami-slicing,” and argue that allowing this sort of activity thwarts the 
 
 
 81. Id. Relatedly, these critics are concerned with perceived loopholes in the Act which enable 
what they call abuses. These loopholes include alternative indications or off-label use which allow 
‘Blockbuster’ drugs to unnecessarily benefit from the Act’s incentives, as well as ‘salami slicing’ 
problems, both of which are discussed infra at Part II. 
 82. Côté & Keating, supra note 17, at 1186 (five therapeutic classes account for 75% of the 
orphan drug market: oncology/cancer therapeutics, metabolic disorders, hematology, infectious 
diseases, and neurological disorders).  
 83. Carter & Bennett, supra note 32, at 631 (recognizing that the Act may over-incentivize 
production of treatments for rare cancers). 
 84. Note the 2003 completion of the Human Genome mapping project. Reardon, supra note 16. 
This area of study is called pharmoacogenomics. David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the 
Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses? 31 AM. J. LAW & 
MED. 365, 365 (2005) (noting “Drug applicants will include true orphan drugs along with ‘Trojan’ 
applicants that seek to co-opt the benefits for drugs that should not qualify as orphans.”). 
 85. Reardon, supra note 16, at 16 (noting that lymphoma affects nearly 700,000 people in the 
United States, but “has been sliced into several dozen subgroups,” resulting in FDA grants of orphan-
drug designations to specific lymphoma treatments at least 21 times). 
 86. Id. Critics complain that this sort of situation (1) prioritizes a treatment for a subset of those 
with the condition over a treatment for those with the condition as a whole, and (2) may incentivize 
later secondary indications or off-label use for all of the other individuals affected by the condition 
(meaning the original drug should not have qualified for the incentives of the Act at all). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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real purpose of the Act.
87
 In contrast, pharmaceutical companies point out 
that the use of pharmacogenetics (commonly termed “personalized 
medicine”) allows them to create drugs that target inherited genetic 
markers and are not only more effective, but also less likely to cause 
adverse reactions.
88
 Though the FDA requires “scientifically plausible 
evidence for the uniqueness of a disease,” critics claim that this is not a 
high bar given recent scientific advances.
89
  
Although we continue to see an increasing number of orphan drug 
designations, it is important to note that the incentives generated by the 
Act have not changed. In fact, repeated attempts at amendment have 
failed, indicating that the status quo is likely to remain.
90
 Yet if the 
incentives have not changed, then why are so many new orphan drugs 
hitting the market? Critics have pointed to two possibilities: (1) certain 
orphan drugs are now economically viable to produce under the Act’s 
provisions, and (2) it is increasingly difficult to improve upon treatments 
for more common diseases. 
Pharmaceutical companies have seen that at least some treatments for 
orphan conditions are economically viable, and it now makes financial 
sense to pursue them. At least so far, insurance companies have been 
willing to pay the high prices pharmaceutical companies charge to recoup 
sunk costs.
91
 Additionally, orphan drugs are often not a cure, but a 
treatment that patients must undertake for the rest of their lives. Over a 
thirty-year span, pharmaceutical companies have also developed a sense 
 
 
 87. Id. See also Loughnot, supra note 84, at 374 (“In the past, this salami slicing has been based 
on distinctions regarding medical classifications. Pharmacogenomics might allow drug sponsors to 
nudge salami slicing from the arena of medical judgment towards the arena of scientific fact.”); Gary 
A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What's Right with It, 15 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 315 
(1999) (“If a company is successful with this approach, it may acquire multiple approvals for the same 
drug for treating what are essentially facets of the same disease and obtain market exclusivity for a 
drug that is not really an orphan. This process abuses the principles of the Act.”). 
 88. America’s BioPharmaceutical Research Companies, supra note 7, at 6; Biopharmaceutical 
Research & Development, supra note 18, at 3. 
 89. Reardon, supra note 16 (discussing what sorts of subgroups get a designation despite their 
differences from the extremely rare genetic diseases which spurred the creation of the Act in the first 
place). See also Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35117 (June 12, 2013) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
316) (discussing the FDA’s definition of “orphan subset” as an alternative to the “medically plausible” 
language previously used and stating that the phrase “‘medically plausible’ has been misinterpreted by 
sponsors to mean any medically recognizable or clinically distinguishable subset of persons with a 
particular disease or condition . . . [which] if accepted by FDA, could result in artificially narrow 
subsets for the purpose of orphan-drug designation.”).  
 90. See discussion of enacted and proposed amendments infra at I(C) & (E).   
 91. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 3 (citing Dr. Steve Miller, chief medical officer for Express 
Scripts as stating: “We have very little negotiating power because the pharmaceutical company can set 
the price and we have to be a price acceptors.”). 
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for which treatments are more likely to allow costs to be recovered. For 
example, as previously mentioned, cancer treatments command some of 
the highest prices among pharmaceuticals. There is also some evidence 
that companies favor treatments expected to have a profitable secondary 
indication. A recent study from John Hopkins University School of 
Medicine reports a pattern of pharmaceutical companies taking advantage 
of the incentives of the Orphan Drug Act, only to later market the drug for 
broader off-label use, resulting in large profits.
92
 This study also supports 
critics who believe that the incentives of the Act are effectively different 
from what Congress intended because, while there have been no 
amendments, pharmaceutical companies have been better able to exploit 
weaknesses in the incentive structure of the Act.  
Those well attuned to the business models of the pharmaceutical 
industry know that the twentieth century was full of “blockbuster drugs,” 
but in the modern era it has become increasingly difficult for 
pharmaceutical companies to create improvements to already existing 
products for common diseases and conditions.
93
 In contrast, in the orphan 
drug world, there are often no competing treatment options.
94
 The orphan 
drug market is growing at almost double the rate of the overall 
prescription drug market, and orphan drugs have a median retail cost 13.8 
times higher than non-orphan drugs.
95
 Moreover, eight orphan drugs hit 
the blockbuster level in 2014,
96
 and seven of the top ten best-selling drugs 
in 2015 had at least one orphan designation.
97
 These realities suggests that 
pharmaceutical companies are increasingly incorporating orphan drugs 
into their business plans. 
H. International Considerations 
After the United States adopted the 1983 Orphan drug Act, Japan, 
Australia, the EU, and the UK passed similar acts.
98
 While each country 
 
 
 92. ‘Orphan Drug’ Loophole Needs Closing, Johns Hopkins Researchers Say, JOHNS HOPKINS 
MED. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/orphan_drug_ 
loophole_needs_closing_johns_hopkins_researchers_say (interviewing the researchers who conducted 
the study: Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission to Rare Diseases, 
AM. J. CLIN. ONCOL. (Nov. 17, 2015) [Epub ahead of print]). 
 93. Cardenas-Navia, supra note 25. 
 94. Id. at 1317. 
 95. Orphan Drug Report 2015, EVALUATEPHARMA 6, 8 (Oct. 2015), http://info. 
evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/EPOD15.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 11. 
 97. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59. 
 98. Christopher McCabe, Karl Claxton & Aki Tsuchiya, Orphan drugs and the NHS: should we 
value rarity?, 331 BMJ 1016, 1017 (2005). 
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(or group of countries) passed its own particularized version of the Act,
99
 
each country focused on creating incentives for the production of 
treatments for rare conditions through limited market exclusivity, eased 
drug testing processes, and financial incentives. In recent years, however, 
differences in reimbursement policies for drug funding have resulted in 
dissimilar environments for pharmaceutical companies.
100
 For example, in 
Europe, recent policies have increased uncertainty about which treatments 
will be reimbursed, particularly in countries where health care is primarily 
publicly financed.
101
 In the United States, on the other hand, orphan drugs 
have become an increasingly large part of the pharmaceutical market.
102
  
PART II: JUSTIFICATIONS 
To determine the best course of action regarding the Orphan Drug Act 
going forward, it is necessary to look critically at when, and to what 
extent, the incentives of the Act can be justified. This Note draws on 
perspectives from the medical and legal communities to identify principles 
from which amendments to the Act may be evaluated. In Part III, 
commonly proposed amendments will be evaluated in light of these 
principles.  
A. The Greatest Good Approach: A Classic Utilitarian Perspective  
Classical utilitarianism advocates for “the greatest good for the greatest 
number.”103 But the question of how to apply this deceptively simple 
principle has produced a surprising amount of debate. Most of the debate 
circles around two questions: how do we define the “good” that we want 
to maximize, and how do we deal with minority needs and perspectives?  
 
 
 99. Laws passed in each country vary in how they define “rare” condition, set terms of 
exclusivity, and whether they allow later review of orphan status. For example, while in the U.S. a rare 
condition affects 6.4 individuals per 10,000 and guaranteed market exclusivity is 7 years, in the EU a 
rare condition is one which affects less than 5 individuals per 10,000 and market exclusivity is 10 
years. Drummond & Towse, supra note 2, at 335. The U.S. definition of “rare” is the most generous in 
the world, with Japan, Australia and the UK requiring a prevalence of 4, 1.1, and 0.18 individuals 
affected per 10,000 respectively. Id. 
 100. See Drummond & Towse, supra note 2, at 335. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Reardon, supra note 16 (noting that in 2013 more than one-third of all new drugs approved 
by the FDA were orphan designated drugs). 
 103. This phrase was coined by the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. See John Black, 
Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles, “utilitarianism”, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, (3d ed.) 
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199237043.013.3277 (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
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This note discusses utilitarianism as it applies to “public health” and 
contrasts that perspective with legal utilitarianism as characterized by the 
classic works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The following 
discussion applies the utilitarian philosophy to answer two questions: (1) 
what does this philosophy say about the principles underlying the Orphan 
Drug Act, and (2) what should amendments to the Act achieve? 
1. The Medical Utilitarian Perspective: Public Health 
The Orphan Drug Act must first be understood in context as but one 
piece within the broad domain of public health. One of the most 
“influential contemporary definitions” of public health, proposed by The 
Institute of Medicine, is: “[p]ublic health is what we, as a society, do 
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”104 The word 
“conditions” is of particular importance in this definition. Public health is 
primarily concerned with prevention, and envisions public conditions in 
which the public is sick less, spends less on healthcare, and is better 
prepared for natural disasters.
105
 Typical public health policies include 
vaccinations, worker safety standards, child nutrition programs, and 
seatbelts.
106
 Nevertheless, it is impossible to eliminate every threat to each 
individual’s health,107 and the goal is not to attempt to do so. Even though 
any one orphan condition is rare, orphan conditions afflict 10% of the total 
American population, a significant figure from a public health perspective.  
Facilitating the availability of treatments for such a large portion of the 
population is consistent with the goal of “creating conditions for people to 
be healthy.” However, those 10% are affected by thousands of different 
conditions, and creating individual treatments for each one requires 
extensive resources.
108
 If the Orphan Drug Act enables treatments for only 
a small portion of these rare conditions, and at a high cost, it becomes 
harder to justify the preference for orphan drugs under the public health 
rationale. Justifying this preference becomes even more difficult if, as a 
 
 
 104. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS 2 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 105. Fact Sheet: What is Public Health?, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, http://apha.org/~/ 
media/files/pdf/factsheets/whatisph.ashx. (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).  
 106. What is Public Health?, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, http://apha.org/what-is-public-health (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
 107.  PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 104, at 3. “The IOM definition also makes clear 
that even the most organized and socially conscious society cannot guarantee complete physical and 
mental well-being.”. 
 108. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5. Some treatments may be approved for 
multiple rare conditions, but even added together these represent a small portion of the population. 
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number of sources suggest, the Act is effectively incentivizing only certain 
categories of rare conditions, such as rare cancers.
109
  
i. Can the Traditional Role of Public Health be Applied to Orphan 
Conditions? 
Public health policy is primarily concerned with conditions that affect 
the public as a whole. Thus, to apply the traditional framework of public 
health to the Orphan Drug Act, a statue necessarily targeted at individual 
small population groups, is unconventional Two main premises buttress 
the global health regime. First, there exist collective health goods that 
individuals cannot obtain acting alone and second, “collective entities 
(e.g., governments and communities) take responsibility for healthy 
populations.”110  
To apply these premises to the Orphan Drug Act, first we must ask 
whether treatments for orphan conditions can qualify as “collective 
goods.” Generally, public health advocates use the term “collective goods” 
to refer to goods indiscriminately valued by everyone, like “environmental 
protection, hygiene and sanitation, clean air and surface water, 
uncontaminated food and drinking water . . . .”111 On their own, 
individuals can only make so much progress towards reaching each of 
these health “goods,” and it is only through a collective effort that they can 
be ultimately realized. Drugs for rare conditions are not indiscriminately 
valued by everyone, because they primarily benefit only those afflicted by 
the rare conditions. Nevertheless, they are a collective good to the extent 
that they are difficult to acquire without collective effort; an individual 
with a rare and untreatable condition cannot generally fund the needed 
research acting alone. The policy behind “collective health goods,” that 
“there is a great deal that individuals cannot do to secure their health, and 
therefore these individuals need to organize and collaborate on building 
infrastructure and developing shared resources,”112 applies squarely to 
orphan conditions. Shared resources and collaboration are the only means 
by which treatments can be developed, as the financial means and 
knowledge to do so is generally beyond the individuals affected.  
 
 
 109. Carter & Bennett, supra note 32, at 631 (recognizing that the Act may over-incentivize 
production of treatments for rare cancers). 
 110. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 104, at 3. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Second, we must ask whether the global health mandate that 
“collective entities” take responsibility for healthy populations applies to 
the health of those with rare conditions. Certainly those with rare 
conditions are a substantial part of the population at almost 1 in 10 
Americans. Additionally, if public health is providing the conditions for 
people to be healthy, a world in which a higher proportion of diseases are 
treatable will certainly enable more people to be healthy. Under the U.S. 
Constitution, while you have a right to education, you do not have a 
comparable right to healthcare.
113
 The Supreme Court has held that there is 
“no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
necessary to secure life . . . .”114 Nevertheless, Congress exercised its 
permissive ability to provide government funding and incentives for the 
treatment of rare diseases through the Orphan Drug Act, determining that 
it was in the public interest to do so.
115
 Thus the question is: which public 
health principles should guide amendments to the Act?  
ii. Why is the Act Controversial from a Public Health Perspective? 
Unlike most health policies enacted by Congress, the Orphan Drug Act 
does not compel individuals or companies to act.
116
 Consequently, the 
Orphan Drug Act is a relatively uncontroversial policy from a public 
health perspective.
117
 However, critics suggest that the Act improperly 
distort the relative importance of different public health concerns, 
violating “[a] principle aim of public health [which] is to achieve the 
greatest health benefits for the greatest number of people.”118 By 
definition, the Act is focused only on the health benefits of small groups of 
people who might otherwise be overlooked. This criticism goes to the 
policy consideration already mentioned: incentives of the Act ought to 
 
 
 113. Dean M. Harris, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE LAW & ETHICS 261 (4th Ed. 
2014). 
 114. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
 115. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2049 (1983) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15, 21, 26, 35, 42 & 95 U.S.C) (“The Congress finds that. . .  it is in the public interest to 
provide such changes and incentives for the development of orphan drugs.”). 
 116. Compare e.g., seatbelt laws, vaccination laws, coverage requirements for insurers, worker 
safety laws, etc. These problems and many others are more likely to invoke due process concerns. See 
generally, Kathleen Hoke, Due Process and Public Health, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L., 
http://apha.org/~/media/files/pdf/factsheets/due_process_and_public_health_factsheet.ashx (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
 117. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 104, at 10 (generally discussing the controversial 
public health policies which involve personal and economic liberties).  
 118. Id. at 14. 
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encourage the creation of treatments for as many individuals affected with 
orphan conditions as possible. 
The Act is also criticized from a public health perspective because 
outcomes generated by the Act’s provisions do not always align with the 
public health view of which values should be maximized for the common 
good. “[P]ublic health . . . draws from the traditions of consequentialism, 
which judges the rightness of an action by the consequences, effects, or 
outcomes that it produces.”119 For example, a proponent of public health 
might say that researchers should focus more attention and resources to 
developing treatments for life-threatening or seriously debilitating 
conditions, because such conditions generally create the greatest societal 
burden.
120
 Alternatively, a proponent of public health might advocate for a 
calculation “maximizing health benefits in terms of a single index, 
combining life expectancy and health related quality of life, such as 
quality adjusted life years or disability adjusted life years[.]”121 Such a 
calculation would ensure that the most individuals receive the most 
beneficial outcomes. While public health proponents will disagree as to 
what outcomes should ultimately be maximized, they nevertheless would 
agree that the choice of which treatments to pursue should not be based 
solely on economic considerations.  
Accordingly, the public health perspective provides three guiding 
principles: the Act should incentivize the creation of treatments for a wide 
swath of those affected with orphan conditions, we should critically 
consider which outcomes are being maximized under the current 
incentives of the Act, and, generally, we should be aware that profit 
considerations might distort the ultimate effect of the Act. 
2. The legal utilitarian perspective 
Under the legal utilitarian approach, the question is not whether the Act 
creates utility,
122
 but rather whether the current version of the Act creates 
 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. Drummond & Towse, supra note 2, at 335, 339 (discussing European law which applies only 
to rare diseases that are life-threatening or seriously debilitating). 
 121. C. A. Gericke, A. Riesberg & R. Busse, Ethical Issues in Funding Orphan Drug Research 
and Development, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 164 (2005) (giving examples of ways in which European 
countries have considered evaluating and comparing orphan conditions). 
 122. See The History of Utilitarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sep. 22, 
2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (Noting Bentham’s view of “the 
principle of utility as the standard of action on the part of governments. . . .”). At its core the Orphan 
Drug Act has the utilitarian purpose of promoting happiness through health for those whose conditions 
would be treated, as well as the friends and family of the patient. Moreover, the purpose of the 
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the most utility for the most people. This discussion identifies the 
principles that guide legal utilitarians in considering amendments to the 
Act.  
First, it is necessary to define utility and to evaluate whether the Act 
creates utility. The classic utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, proposed that 
utility means increasing pleasure and decreasing pain.
123
 The Act increases 
happiness for those whose conditions are now treatable with no resulting 
unhappiness except, perhaps, to those who believe government could have 
better spent their tax dollars. Therefore, under Bentham’s view, the Act 
creates utility. Whether it creates the most utility for the most people is 
less clear. 
Though the Act creates utility, utilitarians may still criticize the Act for 
failing to maximize utility.
124
 The utilitarian’s criticisms take several 
forms. First, the Act tends to weigh the good of a few more highly than the 
good of many. This criticism does not refer to the fact that those with rare 
conditions are the only ones who directly benefit from the provisions of 
the Act. Instead, weighing the good of a few over the good of many is a 
criticism the Act’s critics call “salami-slicing,” or targeting a small subset 
of a larger group in order to obtain an orphan indication.
125
 The legal 
utilitarian would argue that resources should go towards the entire group 
affected by the condition with few exceptions. For example, a utilitarian 
might not object to allocating funds to an affected population of limited 
size when treatment options already exist for that population but are not 
effective for a certain subset, or when the benefit of the new treatment is 
quantifiably greater for that subset.
126
 Additionally, all else equal, the legal 
utilitarian would object to the Act’s two-tiered path to obtaining orphan 
designation, where conditions that affect more than 200,000 Americans 
 
 
treatments is to reduce pain, including the patients pain caused by the condition, the pain of not having 
any hope of treatment, and sometimes the pain of visible deformities or lost abilities.  
 123. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
Ch I (II) (1781), available at http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html (“By the 
principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever 
according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that 
happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private 
individual, but of every measure of government.”). 
 124. For purposes of this section, I assume that the Orphan Drug Act and the incentives it creates 
are justified, and consider only this criticism. 
 125. Loughnot, supra note 84, at 36667 (giving examples of ways which a subdividing diseases 
can result in exploitations of the Act’s incentives).  
 126. In some cases, orphan drugs are prescribed more broadly for all of those affected by the rare 
condition. Id. at 371 (giving the example of Epogen, which was approved only for anemia associated 
with the orphan condition end-stage renal disease, but was then prescribed broadly off-label). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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are subject to more stringent standards than those affecting less than 
200,000 Americans, even though the latter has the potential to yield 
greater utility by affecting a larger population.
127
 This was one of the 
consequences of the 1984 amendments.
128
 
A second utilitarian criticism of the Act emerges from the broader 
definition of utility embraced by Bentham’s student, John Stewart Mill. 
Bentham believed that no pleasure was inherently greater than another, 
putting base sensual pleasures on the same level as pleasures derived from 
accomplishments of skill, the arts, benevolence, or time spent with friends 
and family.
129
 His student expanded the definition of utility to encompass 
a broader range of pleasures.
130
 Mill further posited that pleasures can 
naturally be differentiated and stated: “[i]t is quite compatible with the 
principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are 
more desirable and more valuable than others.”131 Mill argued that those 
pleasures we must wait longer to realize are more valuable than others, 
including “the mere pleasures of the moment.”132 
Accordingly, the Act may be criticized for failing to differentiate 
between greater and lesser pleasures. In other words, all rare conditions 
are incentivized equally, regardless of their severity or the ability of the 
treatment to relieve pain.
133
 The problem of how to differentiate between 
pleasures is generally one which legal utilitarians, Mill included, have 
failed to address in a satisfactory manner.
134
 In fact, Mill’s own method 
was one of the hardest to apply, as it appears that he would have required a 
poll of those who have experienced both pleasures, stating that we can 
easily decide between “two pleasures, if there be one to which all or 
almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, 
irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more 
desirable pleasure.”135 The Act is an example of how difficult applying 
 
 
 127. In reality other concerns, such as the severity of the condition, would also be considered. 
 128. See supra Part I(C). 
 129. Id. at Ch V(II-III) (“Bentham, recall, had held that there were no qualitative differences 
between pleasures, only quantitative ones.”). 
 130. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM Ch. 2 (1863), available at http://www.utilitarianism 
.com/mill2.htm. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Moreover, the correct answer for Mill was not to simply value the condition which affect the 
most people more, as he stated: (“It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality 
is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity 
alone.”). Id. 
 134. Bhardwaj, Kiran, Higher and Lower Pleasures and our Moral Psychology, 1 RES COGITANS 
126, 127 (2010). 
 135. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
318 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:295 
 
 
 
 
Mill’s proposed method can be, as it is likely that no human has ever 
experienced the two rare conditions we wish to compare. A modern 
variation on Mill’s idea of comparing pleasures is the use of medical 
indexes that differentiate between conditions based on life expectancy, 
debilitating effects, and pain.
136
 By using such indices, a legal utilitarian 
can consider the quality of the utility created by new orphan drugs in 
addition to the quantity of individuals affected. 
Legal utilitarians would also be concerned that so few changes have 
been made to the Act, despite many proposals. Broadly stated, 
utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, which is largely concerned 
with the results of an action.
137
 Accordingly, utilitarians are willing to 
consider the outcomes of the Act and enact changes which create greater 
utility given Congress’s goals. This is specifically demonstrated by 
Bentham’s original view of utilitarianism, which directly tied whether an 
act is right or wrong to the results of the act.
138
 Thus, the major changes in 
the climate of the pharmaceutical industry since 1983 are good cause to 
reconsider whether the current results of the Act are truly creating the 
greatest utility.
139
  
Accordingly, the legal utilitarian viewpoint provides three guiding 
principles: the Act should weigh the good of a few over the good of many 
only if there is a sound reason for doing so, the Act should differentiate 
between greater and lesser pleasures, and Congress should readily consider 
amendments in light of a changing pharmaceutical climate. 
B. Individual Rights Based Approaches 
Perspectives focused on individual rights, in contrast to the utilitarian 
approaches just discussed, prioritize individual needs. The individual 
rights based analog to a public health perspective is medical ethics, which 
prioritizes the personal health of individuals. However, it is difficult to 
identify a personal legal analog to utilitarianism. Generally, the law 
consists of rights, obligations, and duties, but under this Act, action is 
 
 
 136. Gericke, Riesberg & Busse, supra note 121. 
 137. The History of Utilitarianism, supra note 122. 
 138. BENTHAM, supra note 123 at Ch I (II) (“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of 
two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well 
as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the 
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.”). 
 139. Id. 
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permissive, not mandated.
140
 The Act places no obligation on any private 
actor to do anything, nor does it give rights to anyone afflicted with an 
orphan disease or condition. Nevertheless, the exclusivity granted under 
the Act is comparable to the exclusivity given to inventors under patent 
law, and the justifications for granting market exclusivity for new drugs 
mirrors many of the justifications for giving exclusive patent rights to 
inventors.
141
 Accordingly, this note considers individual rights in the 
context of medical ethics and intellectual property to answer the questions: 
(1) what do this philosophies say about the principles underlying the 
Orphan Drug Act, and (2) what should amendments to the Act achieve? 
1. The Medical Ethics Approach 
Three concepts in medical ethics have particular relevance when 
considering the policies of the Orphan Drug Act: beneficence, non-
abandonment, and scientific progress. Beneficence broadly includes “all 
forms of action intended to benefit other persons [or] to contribute to their 
welfare.” Embedded within this is the requirement that “agents take 
positive steps to help others, not merely to refrain from harmful acts, or to 
treat individuals autonomously.”142 The Act, which encourages the 
production of treatments to help those who cannot help themselves, is thus 
a prime example of beneficence. Acclaimed biomedical ethics 
philosophers Beauchamp and Childress, advocate a form of beneficence 
where “agents balance benefits, risks, and costs.”143 In other words, 
Beauchamp and Childress recognize that there are limits to how we 
improve welfare. In terms of the Act, this means that production of a drug 
that may save a life might come before one that merely improves a 
person’s standard of living given the same costs.144  
 
 
 140. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 104, at 10. (“Rather than using ethical discourse. 
. . the law uses the language of duties, powers, and rights.”). 
 141. Interestingly, the utilitarian theories discussed above have commonly been applied to the 
patent system generally. See Emma Perot, Maximizing Utility: Applying Utilitarian Theory to 
International Patent Law, 5 KING’S STUDENT L. REV. 58, 59 (2014) (“It will be argued that 
utilitarianism, despite its criticisms, is the most suitable ethical theory to apply [to International Patent 
Law]. . . .”). See also David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case 
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182-183 (2009); Patrick Croskery, 
Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631 (199293). 
 142. Gericke, Riesberg & Busse, supra note 121, at 166. 
 143. Id. 
 144. While in the United States this sort of balancing test has never truly been applied in any 
context, some guidance can be taken from the policies of countries with a comparable Orphan Drug 
Act, but where government insurance is common and the government has decided for financial reasons 
to not cover some of the incentivized orphan drugs. See D.A. Hughes, B. Tunnage & S.T. Yeo, Drugs 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:295 
 
 
 
 
Non-abandonment is an idea originally proposed by Landman and 
Henley, and states that individuals with a need for highly specialized 
medical care should not be abandoned when creating policies for resource 
allocation.
145
 At its heart, the Act is a policy to “counteract distributive 
injustice caused by market incentives.”146 Proponents of non-abandonment 
justify the theory through “caring externalities,” or the idea that 
“individuals derive utility from the satisfaction of providing help to those 
in need.”147 There is also some evidence that the public generally agrees 
with this policy, though not when the money could more cost-effectively 
improve the health of a larger number of people.
148
   
Scientific advancement is the idea that research into rare diseases is 
important because it develops the overall knowledge base of 
researchers.
149
 By funding medical research now, we are able to provide 
hope that in the future all rare conditions will have a treatment.
150
 
However, reaching this goal will take much longer if parties do not share 
research, because competing groups will duplicate the same research, 
wasting time and money. Currently, collaboration efforts are primarily 
headed by the Genetic and Rare Diseases Information Center, a 
department under the National Institute of Health’s National Center for 
Advancing Translational Sciences.
151
  
Accordingly, the three guiding principles from an individualistic 
medical perspective are: while we will take active positive steps to help 
those with rare conditions, we may value the pursuit of some treatments 
over the pursuit of others because of costs, benefits, and risks; under the 
policy of non-abandonment, we should seek to pursue treatments for 
untreatable conditions over those which are simply rare; and in the interest 
 
 
for Exceptionally Rare Diseases: Do They Deserve Special Status for Funding?, 98 Q. J. Med. 829, 
830 (2005). 
 145. Gericke, Riesberg & Busse, supra note 121, at 166. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Hughes, Tunnage & Yeo, supra note 144, at 833. See also Drummond & Towse, supra note 
2, at 335, 337 (surveys in Europe indicating the publics opinion that individuals have a right to 
treatment, regardless of the rarity of their condition, but also noting that in some surveys there was a 
lack of support for a special funding status for rare disease treatments). 
 149. Gericke, Riesberg & Busse, supra note 121, at 166 (“Funding medical science in general has 
been considered as fulfilling a moral obligation of beneficence for existing patients who are given 
hope that treatments might be developed to cure them, and as a societal commitment to provide 
potential benefits for future generations.”). 
 150. Id.  
 151. See About GARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
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of scientific discovery we will create policies that encourage the 
collaborative sharing of information regarding rare conditions. 
2. The legal approach 
The Orphan Drug Act provides, among other incentives, seven years of 
exclusivity, giving it some similarities to patent law.
152
 Through patents, 
an inventor receives limited market exclusivity in exchange for revealing 
the secrets of her invention in a publicly available patent application.
153
 
The theory is that absent the right to exclude, the inventor could not 
recoup sunk costs, and therefore would lack economic incentive to 
invent,
154
 or, if she did create, she might attempt to keep the knowledge of 
her discovery a secret to prevent competition.
155
 To determine whether 
exclusivity incentives should be altered, Congress should consider whether 
“there is a market failure present.” In other words, it is important to 
determine, whether absent the Orphan Drug Act, too little innovation 
would occur because of economic considerations.
156
  
To make this determination, three questions are relevant: (1) “Would 
this type of innovation occur at sufficient levels without a patent grant? 
(2) Would granting a patent right for this type of innovation cause more 
loss to society than gain?” and “(3) If society would not benefit from 
granting patentability to the particular type of innovation, can sufficiently 
clear lines be drawn between this subject matter and other subject matter 
that does need the protection of patentability?”157 These three questions 
can be applied to the Orphan Drug Act in order to determine what guiding 
principles patent law provides for considering amendments to the Act.  
When the Act was passed, Congress addressed the first question: 
whether anyone would create orphan drugs absent the Act’s incentives. 
Congress stated, “because so few individuals are affected by any one rare 
disease or condition . . . there is reason to believe that some promising 
orphan drugs will not be developed unless changes are made in the 
 
 
 152. Patent law grants inventors exclusive rights to make, use, offer to sell, or sell their patented 
invention during the term of the patent, which is currently 20 years from the date the patent application 
was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2). 
 153. Olson, supra note 141. 
 154. Id. at 18283. 
 155. In the pharmaceutical context, regulations and required FDA disclosures make keeping 
aspects of the drug’s composition a secret practically impossible. Compare, for example, the secret 
formula of Coca-Cola®. 
 156. Olson, supra note 141 at 184. 
 157. Id.  
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applicable Federal laws . . . .”158 News reports and literature published 
before the Act’s implementation further support these statements.159 The 
principle established from this first question is that, to the extent possible, 
we should incentivize the creation of only drugs for rare diseases that 
would not be developed in the absence of the Act. 
The second question, whether granting exclusivity for this type of 
innovation causes more loss to society than gain, is much harder to apply 
to the unique case of the Orphan Drug Act. There is no clear loss to 
society when exclusivity is given in exchange for research and 
development of a treatment for an orphan condition. In the patent arena, 
one of the concerns is that the exclusivity provided by patent law will 
allow prices to go unchecked, which may then place a treatment beyond 
the price point of some consumers.
160
 At least in the United States, orphan 
drugs have been accessible even to those who cannot afford them through 
the intervention of non-profits and the benevolence of pharmaceutical 
companies who often give the drug away for free to those who cannot 
afford it.
161
 
The third question, whether sufficiently clear lines can be drawn 
between this subject matter and other subject matter that does need the 
protection of patentability, is particularly relevant. Even if developing 
treatments for certain conditions should be incentivized, but the treatment 
of other conditions should not be, the distinction is irrelevant if we are 
unable to draw a clear line between the two. In the context of the Act, the 
cost of excluding conditions that are truly not economical to produce 
otherwise is high. More than 95% of rare conditions have no treatment, 
and without incentives, treatments for these conditions are unlikely to be 
developed. This possibility suggests that where a clear line cannot be 
drawn, the tendency should be towards over-inclusiveness. 
Thus a comparison to patent law reveals the following guiding 
principles: incentives should be limited to those treatments which would 
not otherwise be developed, but since that distinction may not be clear, we 
should be careful to draw either a clear line or an over-encompassing one. 
 
 
 158. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2049 (1983). 
 159. See, e.g. Lasagna, supra note 1. 
 160. This is a concern when developing countries are involved, and the benefit to the 
pharmaceutical company must be balanced with the health value achieved as a function of which how 
many of the affected individuals can financially access the treatment. See Perot, supra note 141, at 68. 
 161. Suzanne Shelley, The Business of Orphan Drugs is Booming, PHARMACEUTICAL COMMERCE 
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/brand-marketing-communications/ the-business-
of-orphan-drugs-is-booming/ (discussing Patient Assistance Programs (PAPs) which allow patients 
access to free or low cost medications). 
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III. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 
The Orphan Drug Act has been criticized from many perspectives. 
While some of those criticisms are intrinsic to the idea of providing large 
financial incentives to research conditions affecting a small number of 
individuals, some may be remedied by amending the incentive structure of 
the Act. The following is an example of how the previous discussion of 
utilitarian and individual rights perspectives in the medical and legal 
communities might guide consideration of the most commonly proposed 
change. The hope is that through this example, other common criticisms, 
such as the existence of a “blockbuster” loophole, and the potential for 
“salami-slicing,” will also be discussed in terms of guiding principles from 
different relevant perspectives. 
A. Redefining Orphan Condition  
The most common proposed amendment to the Orphan Drug Act is a 
definition of orphan condition that encompasses more than rarity.
162
 
Advocates for this type of amendment believe the core purpose of the Act 
is to encourage research and development of drugs that would not 
otherwise be created.
163
 They argue that while the defining feature of an 
“orphan disease” is rarity, there are strong policy reasons for adding 
additional criteria such as severity, other existing therapy options, and 
potential for improved life quality.
164
 
There are important historical reasons for why this proposed change 
has been unable to gain traction. In the 1984 Amendments, Congress 
implicitly rejected the claim that the Orphan Drug Act was intended to 
stimulate only the production of drugs not economically viable.
165
 
Originally, the Act applied only to drugs expected to be economically 
unviable,
166
 but in 1984 Congress amended the Act, allowing proof that 
the orphan condition affects less than 200,000 Americans as a stand-in.
167
 
At the very least, Congress found that the extensive financial data required 
 
 
 162. See e.g. Reardon, supra note 16; Côté & Keating, supra at 17; Carter & Bennett, supra note 
32. 
 163. Gericke, Riesberg & Busse, supra note 121. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See discussion supra at Part I(C). 
 166. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (“Rare disease or condition” 
was defined as “any disease or condition which occurs so infrequently in the United States that there is 
no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug 
for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.”). 
 167. Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815, 2817 (1984). 
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to evaluate economic viability was too great of a deterrence to the 
development of needed treatments for rare conditions.  
However, almost every guiding principle favors an amendment to the 
definition of “orphan drug.” From the legal utilitarian viewpoint, we 
understand that in light of the rapidly changing pharmaceutical climate, 
evaluating whether the Act creates the most utility means considering 
whether the Act is incentivizing the production of new treatments as 
originally intended. Public health principles also weigh in favor of 
amendment because under the current Act, all “rare” conditions are 
weighted equally though studies suggest that pharmaceutical companies 
are actively pursuing only limited subsets of rare treatments. The guiding 
principles underlying three of the four perspectives suggest that 
differentiation based on more than rarity is justified, because quality 
concerns should be considered as well as quantity, the wrong outcomes are 
being maximized, or because of a cost, benefit, and risk analysis. 
Weighing against an amendment to the definition of “orphan drug” is 
the concern that a new definition would exclude rare conditions that are 
not economically viable to produce apart from the incentives of the Act. 
This concern is reflected by the guiding principle that if a clear line cannot 
be drawn, an over-inclusive line should be used instead. Further, while the 
guiding policies considered suggest that the definition of “orphan drug” 
could be amended to better conform with the intention of the Act, they do 
not consider the potential consequences of disrupting the stability of the 
Act over the last thirty years. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For over thirty years, The Orphan Drug Act has represented hope to 
millions of Americans, and incentivized the discovery and development of 
treatments for rare diseases. Despite major advancements in the 
pharmacological industry and nearly yearly calls for amendment, however, 
the core incentive structure of the Act has remained unchanged since 1984. 
Critics have demonstrated that the incentive structure of the Act has 
encouraged research into certain categories of rare conditions over others 
based on economic considerations, rather than considerations of need or 
condition severity. Further, recent data has suggested that long-discussed 
“loopholes” in the Act have resulted in “blockbuster orphans” and 
“salami-slicing” conditions that take advantage of the incentive structure 
for conditions affecting more than 200,000 Americans. I have proposed 
that part of the reason that proposed changes to the Act have been 
unsuccessful is that the proposed changes are reactionary—concerned 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/8
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primarily with alleviating high-profile perceived injustices in the 
application of the Act’s incentives. Alternatively, I have developed a series 
of eleven guiding principles from an examination of four normative 
stances in the legal and medical community, and have demonstrated that 
these principles can be used to weigh proposed amendments. It is time to 
fix the Orphan Drug Act, and give all thirty million Americans affected 
with rare conditions hope.  
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